
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		onstrations are threatened in	
		ery maneuvers scheduled to be grange on the slopes of Mt.	
	itant Sohyo labor	federation and the Japanese	Socialist party
		onstrations to supplement the	
		ers. Government officials in to persuade farmers to withdo	
		they have been staging a sit-	
	tize their demand	l for return of the land to cul	tivation. Defense
		Sensuke Fujieda, with the sur	
		has recommended that the cal the farmers, but no action h	
1	en.	are regarded, but no action is	non 1 an wasse assure
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		Pakistan: The Afghan Governistan that Kabul will sever di	
		iber unless Pakistan reconsid	
	decision to close	Afghan consulates and trade	offices in Pak-/
		ans apparently regard the clo	
		ade despite Pakistani assuran ministered by other means.	
	Pakistani ambass	sador in Kabul had told a US F	Embassy official
	that "we are read	dy for any response. If they	wish to sever (
		ons we are ready. If they wi	sh to make some 25X1
	atronger respons	The we are ready too.	
		_	
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	Ethiopia: About 200 persons suspected of disloyalty to the Emperor, including the president of the imperial court, were reportedly arrested in Addis Ababa during the night of 29-30 August. Security officials may have feared that reformist elements were plotting to overthrow the regime while Emperor Haile Selassie attends the conference of nonaligned nations in Belgrade.	
25X1	The crown prince, named by the rebels during the abortive coup last December to head their new government, told Ambassador Richards recently that he now was associated with two reformist groups—one composed of young progressives and the other certain leading military figures. The crown prince professed the hope of exerting a moderating in—	No
	fluence on the two groups in order to avoid a revolution—which he foresaw if matters were allowed to drift. *The crown prince has accompanied the Emperor to Belgrade, but an attempt at a coup during his absence cannot be ruled out.	25X1
25X1	(Backup, Page 5)	
	SELECTED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES	
	(Available during the preceding week)	
25X1	Main trends in Soviet capabilities and policies, 1961–1966. Annex A, Soviet military forces and capabilities. Annex B, Tables. U.S.I.B. NIE 11-4-61, annexes A and B. Aug 24'61. 0037000.	
	Soviet tactics in the Berlin crisis: chances of new unilateral action, Soviet attitude toward negotiations, timing of diplomatic moves, and effect of developments in East Germany. U.S.I.B. SNIE 11-10-61. Aug 24'61.	☐ 25X1
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Leftists Oppose US Maneuvers in Japan

Japanese leftists have apparently decided that the most recent dispute over the northern sector of the Fuji-McNair maneuver grounds can be exploited in their campaign against the US-Japanese alliance and Japan's modest defense build-up. Since they failed earlier this year to halt government construction of a missile test range on Niijima, an island south of Tokyo, they have been seeking another issue capable of capturing the headlines.

The controversy over the two ranges on the northern and eastern slopes of Mount Fuji has caused almost constant agitation since the ratification of the US-Japanese security treaty in June 1960. Farmers claim that the right to use the land for military purposes ended with the expiration of the 1952 security treaty under which the ranges were established. They want the land returned. The farmers use the area as a source of firewood, fodder, and compost. The range also obstructs Japanese tourists on pilgrimages to the sacred mountain.

Last August, the newly installed Ikeda government ended similar protests by promising local residents to seek US release of the facility, now used by both US and Japanese forces. Negotiations for its return to Japanese control began last September. The governments of Yamanashi and Shizuoka prefectures, where the ranges are located, believe their economic problem would be eased by conversion of some of the land to agricultural uses.

American observers have noted the use in recent months of increasingly sophisticated measures such as lawsuits and economic pressures by opponents of the bases. The Japanese Government's growing concern led to the establishment on 30 May of committees at cabinet and sub-cabinet level for dealing with military base problems and preventing, if possible, the development of controversial situations.

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Afghanistan Threatens to Sever Diplomatic Relations With Pakistan

The Afghans probably hope that the prospect of a complete collapse in Afghan-Pakistani diplomatic relations and the disruption of American aid shipments will bring US pressure on Pakistan. Shipments bound to American aid projects in the Kabul area and in southern Afghanistan are being held up in Pakistan for lack of the necessary documentation, and many projects may soon be brought to a halt if a solution is not found. While the Afghans hope for US intervention, they apparently blame the United States as an accomplice, inasmuch as Pakistan's action follows President Ayub's recent visit to the United States. Expressing Afghan bitterness toward America, Foreign Minister Naim told Ambassador Byroade that the United States should not be concerned since it still had Pakistan as a "good ally" in the area.

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25X1	collaborate to ensure progress and to minimize the chances of conflict. He indicated a preference for bringing about reform gradually by exerting pressure through progressive civilian elements rather than through military control. He admitted that while the army could probably control Addis Ababa, it could not control the rest of the country, where the people are well armed and traditionally independent of central authority.	25X1
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Approved For Release 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T00975A095900200001-4 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President Military Representative of the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director

